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THIS LAND IS MY LAND: THE CLASH
BETWEEN PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
PUBLIC INTEREST IN LUCAS V. SOUTH
CAROLINA COASTAL COUNCIL'
No person shall . . . be deprived of ... property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation. 2
These words seem so simple, yet they lie at the heart of some
of our country's most confusing constitutional doctrine. 5 Implicit in
the governmental limitations that the Fifth Amendment imposes is
the understanding that, in some circumstances, the government
does have the power, with due process of law, to deprive a person
of property or, upon payment of just compensation, to take private
property for public use. 4 The first of these powers is generally
referred to as the police power and the second as the power of
eminent domain. 5 The confusion about where to draw the line
between these two powers makes it difficult to determine when an
404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C.), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 436 (1991).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. V. This requirement is applicable to the states as well as the federal
government. See Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235-41 (1897).
5 See, e.g., Donald W. Large, The Supreme Court and the Takings Clause: The Search For a
Better Rule, 18 &vim,. L. 3, 4 (1987) ("Few issues . . . have proven to be as unsolvable . .");
Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 149 (1971) ("Few
legal problems have proved as resistant to analytical efforts . . . ."). Two of Professor Sax's
articles on takings were recently listed in an article compiling the most cited articles from
The Yale Law Journal, which may indicate the number of writings this topic generates. See
Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Articles from The Yale Law Journal, 100 YALE L.J. 1449, 1462
(1991).
' Patrick Wiseman, When the End Justifies the Means: Understanding Takings Jurisprudence in
a Legal System With Integrity, 63 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 433, 437 (1989).
5 See id. It is the power of eminent domain that is implicated, for example, when the
government physically takes one's land in order to build a new highway or a community
redevelopment project. See, e.g., Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304
N.W.2d 455, 459 (Mich. 1981) (city condemned housing area for construction project de-
signed to revitalize the community). For a discussion of some of the issues that arise with
such physical invasions, see generally Lawrence Berger, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent
Domain, 57 Ox. L. REv. 203, 203 (1978); William Epstein, The Public Purpose Limitation on the
Power of Eminent Domain: A Constitutional Liberty Under Attack, 4 PACE L. REV. 231, 236 (1984);
William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553, 553 (1972).
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exercise of governmental power goes so far as to constitute a taking
of private property for which compensation is required. 6
Currently a record number of Fifth Amendment cases are
pending in the courts that pit private property owners against the
government.'' Many of these cases involve challenges to environ-
mental regulations' As we, as a society, become more aware of our
environment and the ways in which our actions in one area affect
the economic and environmental well-being of other areas, 9 we find
ourselves being forced to sacrifice some of our personal property
rights. ' 6 The property owners in the pending suits generally claim,
however, that they should not be forced to bear the cost of the
environmental restrictions." Unfortunately, the question that then
arises is whether government, especially given the current fiscal state
of our nation, can afford to compensate each landowner affected
by an environmental regulation.' 2
This is just the issue presented by Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council. 13 In February 1991, the South Carolina Supreme Court, in
6 Wiseman, supra note 4, at 438-39; see also Nathaniel S. Lawrence, Regulatory Takings:
Beyond the Balancing Test, 20 Uas. LAW. 389, 389 (1988); Sax, supra note 3, at 149.
7 David Kaplan & Bob Cohn, Pay Me, or Get Off My Land, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 9, 1992, at
70. These authors cite the current conservative judiciary as part of the incentive behind these
suits. Id.
8 Id.
g Eugene Linden, Demanding Payment for Good Behavior, TIME, Feb. 3, 1992, at 52.
10 See id. Mr. Linden quotes Erik Meyers of the Environmental Law Institute, who says
"[t]he freedom to swing your arms stops at your neighbor's nose, and what has happened is
that noses have got [sic] a lot closer together." Id,
" See Kaplan, supra note 7, at 70. Mr. Kaplan notes that if you want to love a tree, it
would be best to buy one. Id.
' 2 See id. Kaplan notes that forcing governments to compensate landowners for regulated
land would cost billions of dollars. Id. Almost any land regulation would conceivably be
affected by such a requirement, including laws protecting wetlands, endangered wildlife,
nature habitats and historic districts. Id.
"Id,; see also Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C.), cert. granted,
112 S. Ct. 436 (1991). The Court has decided at least one other case this term that involved
a takings issue. See Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522, 1526 (1992). In Yee v. City of
Escondido, owners of.mobile home parks challenged the constitutionality of a mobile home
rent control ordinance. Id. Except in certain circumstances, the ordinance compelled a park
owner to accept as a new tenant a person who purchased a mobile home from an existing
tenant. Id. In the lower court, the park owners argued that the ordinance caused the price
of used mobile homes to increase dramatically because the existing tenants were able to
monetize the value of living in a rent controlled area. See id. at 1528. Thus, they argued, the
ordinance constituted a taking because it transferred the monetary interest from the park
owners, who would normally capture the value through increased rents, to the tenants and
gave the tenants a right of physical occupation on the land. See id. In its opinion, the California
Court of Appeal refused to accept the plaintiff's argument that they were required to
acquiesce to the occupation of their property by a third party designated by the government.
Id. at 1527. Thus, the court found that no taking had occurred. See id.
The United States Supreme Court held, in a unanimous opinion, that the ordinance did
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Lucas, held that the South Carolina Beachfront Management Act,
which prohibits building along South Carolina beaches, did not
constitute a compensable taking of the plaintiff's private property."
The Lucas court reasoned that because the statute sought to prevent
a use of the land that would seriously harm the public, the govern-
ment need not compensate the landowner affected by the regula-
tion. 15 The court held that the government regulation was valid
without compensation despite the fact that the plaintiff contended
that he had no remaining economic use for his land. 16 In November
1991, the United States Supreme Court granted Mr. Lucas's petition
for certiorari.' 7
In determining whether a taking has occurred in a case like
Lucas,  a court must undertake a two-step analysis.'s First, a court
determines if there is a property interest that is protected by the
Fifth Amendment.° The United States Supreme Court has adopted
no single definition of property for the purposes of the Takings
Clause, but instead has interpreted property to mean a number of
different things. 2° For example, in one case, the Court held that the
property involved was a physical parcel of land that included all
parts of the property, including the airspace above the building. 21
In another case, the Court considered discrete portions of a building
not effect a per se physical taking. Id. at 1534. While the Court recognized that the mobile
home law limited the bases upon which a park owner could terminate a tenant's lease, the
Court agreed with the state court that nothing compelled the park owners to rent their land
to mobile home owners. Id. at 1528. Instead, the Court viewed the ordinance as merely
regulating the relationship between a landlord and a tenant. Id. at 1529. Such regulations,
the Court continued, cannot be a per se taking based on a physical invasion, but must be
analyzed by engaging in an "ad hoc, factual" inquiry. Id.
The plaintiffs in Yee also argued that the ordinance effected a regulatory taking, and
not just a per se physical taking. See id. at 1531. The Court, however, held that this question
was not properly presented in the petition for certiorari. Id. Therefore, the Court declined
to decide the question of whether the ordinance effected a taking under a factual inquiry.
See id. at 1534.
A second takings case was also scheduled to come before the Court this term. The
petition for certiorari was dismissed, however, on the grounds that it had been improvidently
granted. See PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 928 F.2d 28, 29 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. dismissed,
112 S. Ct. 1151 (1992).
14 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 896 (S.C.), cert. granted,
112 S. Ct. 436 (1991).
16 Id. at 899-901.
16 See id. at 896.
' 7 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 436 (1991).
m See Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles Part I—A
Critique of Current Takings Clause Doctrine, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1301, 1304 (1989).
19 See id. at 1302, 1304.
29 See id. at 1304.
21 See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978).
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where cable equipment had been installed to be property that had
been taken.22 In addition, the Court has found valid property in-
terests in property other than parcels of land, such as economic
rights. 23
 Thus, the Court has provided no single definition of prop-
erty for purposes of the Takings Clause."
In the second step of the takings analysis, a court must deter-
mine whether compensation is required in a particular instance. 25
Here too, the Supreme Court has been unable to develop a "set
formula" to determine when compensation is required. 26 Instead,
the Court has approached the compensation analysis in a number
of different ways.27 For example, in one case the Court applied a
multi-factor balancing test. 28 In other cases, the Court has looked
for a bright-line rule to apply.29 Thus, the United States Supreme
Court has not provided clear guidelines for either the property
interest or the compensation prong of the takings analysis. 3°
This note argues that although the facts of Lucas present a very
sympathetic case for the landowner's claim for compensation, the
facts also present an opportunity for the United States Supreme
Court to refine its takings analysis in a way that explicitly addresses
the interest the public has in a government regulation. Section I
discusses what constitutes a property interest that can be taken."
Section II discusses the history of the Court's approach to compen-
sation under the Takings Clause.32 Section III presents the decision
22 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 438 (1982).
2] See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 967 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984) (trade secrets); Webb's
Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980) (interpleader fund); United
States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945) (tenancy).
24 Peterson, supra note 18, at 1304.
23 Id.
26
 Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
27 Peterson, supra note 18, at 1304; see also United States v. Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma,
480 U.S. 700, 703-04 (1987) (bright-line test); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260
(1980) (bright-line test); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 128-35 (multi-factor balancing test); Had-
acheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 411 (1915) (bright-line test); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S.
623, 658 (1887) (bright-line test).
" See Peterson, supra note 18, at 1333; see also Penn Central, 938 U.S. at 128-35.
" See Peterson, supra note 18, at 1317; see also Cherokee Nation, 480 U.S. at 703-04 (no
balancing required where interference with riverbed resulted from congressional control
over the waters); Agins, 447 U.S. at 260 (zoning law effects a taking if ordinance does not
substantially advance state interests or denies owner economically viable use of land); Had-
acheck, 239 U.S. at 411 (ordinance prohibiting brickyard not a taking because the use of the
property was a nuisance); Mugler, 123 U.S. at 668-69 (ordinance prohibiting manufacture
of liquor not a taking because use of property is injurious to others).
" Peterson, supra note 18, at 1305.
31 See infra notes 37-95 and accompanying text.
32 See infra notes 96-224 and accompanying text.
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of the South Carolina Supreme Court in Lucas." Section IV argues
that, although the United States Supreme Court has been moving
towards a more decisive and bright-line approach in determining
when compensation is required, the Court should instead base its
decisions on a multi-factor balancing test." Section V then proposes
that the Court should explicitly include the public interest as a factor
in this balancing test." Section VI applies the two-step analysis,
utilizing this comprehensive balancing approach, to Lucas and con-
cludes that the South Carolina Beachfront Management Act does
not effect a taking of Mr. Lucas's oceanfront property."
I. THE FIRST PRONG OF THE TAKINGS TEST—FINDING A VALID
PROPERTY INTEREST
The first person who, having fenced off a plot of ground, took it
into his head to say this is mine and found people simple enough
to believe him, was the true founder of civil society."
No matter what the context of a constitutional takings claim,
the threshold question that courts must address is whether a legit-
imate property interest has been affected." Although the word
"property" may seem familiar, the United States Supreme Court
has defined the concept in various ways. 59 The Court has found
property interests in physical parcels of property" and economic
rights.'" In other cases, the Court has held that a legal right must
be vested in order to be property within the meaning of the Takings
Clause.42
53 See infra notes 225-47 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 248-75 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 276-303 and accompanying text.
36 See infra notes 304-75 and accompanying text.
JEAN-JACQUF.S Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Ainong Men,
in THE FIRST AND SECOND DISCOURSES 141 (Roger D. Masters ed., 1964).
" John Martinez, Reconstructing the Takings Doctrine by Redefining Property and Sovereignty,
16 FORDHAM DAB. L.J. 157, 161 (1988); Peterson, supra note 18, at 1308.
" Peterson, supra note 18, at 1304.
4° See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 438 (1982); Penn
Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978).
41 See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984) (trade secrets); Webb's
Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980) (interpleader fund); United
States v. General Motors Corp„ 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945) (tenancy).
42 See Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 607 (1987) (right to receive support payments
from a noncustodial parent not vested); Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Security
Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 55 (1986) (right to prevent removal of contract termination clause
not vested).
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A. Physical Parcels of Properly
Although the United States Supreme COurt sometimes defines
property for Takings Clause purposes as a physical parcel of land,
the boundaries of the parcel may differ from case to case." In 1978,
the Court, in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, defined
the relevant unit of property as a parcel of land that the city had
designated as a historic landmark site.44
 The landowner argued that
the government had deprived it of the airspace above Grand Cen-
tral Terminal because it denied the plaintiff permission to construct
a fifty-three story office building on top of the terminal. 45
 The Court
noted that the city had designated the parcel as a whole, encom-
passing the entire block, as a landmark site. 46
 Therefore, the Court
reasoned that the plaintiff's takings claim must be analyzed with
respect to the whole parcel, which included the airspace.47 Thus,
according to the Penn Central Court, a single parcel could not be
divided into discrete segments in order to determine if rights in a
particular segment had been entirely extinguished. 48
On the other hand, in 1982, in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., the Court held that a valid property interest existed in
just a portion of a larger piece of property.° In Loretto, the alleged
taking was the permanent physical installation of a cable wire on
" Compare Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31 (property is entire parcel of land) with Loretto,
458 U.S. at 438 (property taken can be small portion of larger tangible parcel).
" 438 U.S. at 130-31. The building in question was Grand Central Terminal, located in
midtown Manhattan. Id. at 115. The Penn Central Court noted that the building was regarded
as an "ingenious engineering solution" to the problems presented by urban railroad stations
as well as a "magnificent example of the French beaux-arts style." Id.
" Id. at 130. The owner of the property had two plans for the building, one of which
required that a portion of the terminal be torn town and some of the remaining features of
the terminal's facade be stripped. Id. at 116-17.
" Id. at 130.
4 ' Id. at 130-31. The Court noted that allowing the landowner to establish a taking
merely by showing that he had been deprived the right to develop was "untenable." Id. at
130. The Court observed that this principle was applicable to air rights as well as to the
development of subjacent and lateral land. Id.; see also Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590,
594, 596 (1962) (ordinance prohibiting excavation of land below water table of lake is valid);
Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 604, 610 (1927) {ordinance establishing mandatory set-back
lines for homes is valid).
48 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130; see also Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 335 (1981)
(relevant unit of property is entire parcel not uses to which particular pieces may be put);
cf. Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 192 n.12
(1985) (Court considered land itself, not expectations in the land). But see Keystone Bitumi-
nous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 499 (1987) (Court did not define property
with precision).
" 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982).
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the roof and side of an apartment building the plaintiff owned."
Although the cable wire intruded only onto a small portion of the
landowner's total property, the Court nevertheless held that a taking
had occurred. 5 ' The Loretto Court did not attempt to explain how
it could view the occupation of merely a portion of the landowner's
building as a deprivation of property, when the Penn Central Court
had held that the relevant property for takings purposes was the
parcel as a whole. 52 Therefore, even when the relevant property
affected by an alleged taking is a tangible piece of land, it is not
clear whether the land should be viewed in discrete segments or
only as a complete parcel for purposes of the takings analysis."
13. Economic Rights
In other cases, the Court has not required a physical parcel of
land to find a property interest, but has defined property as eco-
nomically valuable rights created by law. 54 In 1945, in United States
v. General Motors Corp., the Court held that property for Takings
Clause purposes consisted not of the tangible thing itself, but of
certain rights recognized by law with respect to that thing. 55 In
General Motors, the government had exercised its eminent domain
power to acquire a short-term lease from a tenant holding a longer-
term lease. 55 The Court reasoned that when the government exer-
cised its power of eminent domain, it placed itself in the same place
with regard to the property as the tenant from whom the land was
taken. 57 Therefore, the Court held that the government had to deal
5" Id. Originally the cable company installed the cable lines only above the building as
part of the cable "highway" traveling around the city block. Id. at 422. Two years after the
plaintiff bought the apartment building, however, the cable company installed a line that
dropped, from these wires, down the side of the building. Id. This line provided cable service
to the tenants in the plaintiff's building. Id.
5 ' Id. at 421.
52 Peterson, supra note 18, at 1310.
63 See id.
54 See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986,1003-04 (1984) (trade secrets); Webb's
Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155,161 (1980) (interpleader fund); United
States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373,377-78 (1945) (tenancy).
55 323 U.S. 373,377-78 (1945).
5" Id. at 374-75. The original tenant of the building had leased it in 1928 for a twenty-
year term for the storage and distribution of automobile parts. Id. at 375. Then, in 1947,
the United States government sublet a portion of the building from the original tenant. Id.
Shortly thereafter the government condemned the remaining space in the building for
military purposes for a term beginning immediately and ending in June of the following
year. M. A trial ensued to determine the amount of compensation the government owed the
plaintiff. See id. at 376.
57 Id. at 378.
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with the tenant's interest in the property, whether it was a fee simple
or a tenancy. 58 Thus, the General Motors Court did not view the
building as the relevant property, but instead looked to the legal
rights of the original tenant to possess, use and dispose of the
property. 59
Similarly, in 1980, in Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith,
the Court held that money deposited in an interpleader fund with
a state court was property for Takings Clause purposes. 6° At issue
in Webb's was whether the state or the depositors owned the interest
earned on the money deposited in the fund. 6 ' When directed to
remove the money from the fund, the clerk of the court did so, but
neglected to turn the interest over as well. 62 Webb's, as the depositor,
then brought a claim to require the clerk to release the interest
money.65 The Supreme Court of Florida held that the money de-
posited in an interpleader fund was "public money" from the date
of deposit until it left the account.64 Thus, the court held that there
could be no taking because the interest earned during that time was
not private property. 65
The United States Supreme Court disagreed, however, reason-
ing that the property was held in the fund not for the benefit of
the court, but for the benefit of the parties, in this case a corpora-
tion's creditors. 66 Therefore, the Webb's Court held that the creditors
had a property right in their respective portions of the fund.° The
Court thus concluded that the clerk's retention of the interest con-
stituted a taking of private property. 68
58 Id.
59 See id.
60
 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980).
61 Id. at 158. The case involved an agreement between two Florida corporations whereby
one agreed to purchase substantially all the assets of the other. Id. at 156. At the closing of
the deal, the debts of the corporation being purchased, Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc.,
appeared to be greater than its assets. Id. To protect itself, the purchaser, pursuant to state
law, filed a complaint of interpleader and interpleaded as defendants Webb's and its creditors.
Id. at 156-57. The purchaser then tendered the purchase price to the court thereby requiring
creditors to seek relief in the court. Id.
62 Id. at 158. The court subsequently appointed a receiver for Webb's whose responsi-
bilities included determining the number and amount of the claims filed against the inter-
pleader fund. Id. at 157-58. Thus, the receiver moved to have the fund turned over to him
and the court granted the motion. Id. at 158.
0 Id.
64 Id.
63 Id. at 158-59.
6 6 Id. at 161.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 164-65.
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Then, in 1984, in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., the Court found
a property interest in a pesticide manufacturer's trade-secret rights
in health and safety data.° At issue in Ruckelshaus was a federal law
that mandated that any company wishing to register for the man-
ufacture of a pesticide must disclose its health and safety data to
the Environmental Protection Agency." Monsanto claimed that the
required disclosure of confidential commercial information consti-
tuted a taking of private property." The Court recognized that the
extent of a property right in a trade secret was defined by the extent
to which the owner of the secret could protect the secret from
disclosure. 72 The Court acknowledged that trade secrets do have
some characteristics of tangible property interests, such as assigna-
bility, but the Court, citing to General Motors, also held that the
intangible property rights in trade secrets were themselves pro-
tected by law." Thus, the Court affirmed that in addition to tangible
parcels of land," valid property rights could be found in intangible
economic rights."
C. Vested Legal Rights
Non-economic legal rights may also be property for takings
purposes, but the Court has held that such rights must be vested
before they are property protected by the Fifth Amendment. 76 In
1986, in Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment,
the Court held that no taking had occurred because the legal rights
that the plaintiffs claimed to have lost were not vested. 77 The case
involved a written agreement, pursuant to federal law, between the
State of California and the United States Secretary of Health and
" 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984).
71} Id. at 995-96.
71 Id. at 998-99.
n Id. at 1002. The Court noted that information that is public knowledge or generally
known within an industry cannot be a trade secret. Id. The Court also noted that if an
individual discloses a trade secret to someone who is not under any obligation to protect the
confidentiality of the information, then the information loses its status as a property interest.
Id.
73 Id. at 1003.
'4 See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 438 (1982);
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978).
" See Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1003; see also Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith,
449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980); United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-78
(1945).
" See Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 607 (1987); Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed
to Social Security Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 55 (1986).
" 477 U.S. at 55.
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Human Services in which the state agreed to participate in the Social
Security system." A subsequent change in the federal law eliminated
a termination provision in the agreement." The State of California
and several public agencies claimed that the termination provision
was a valuable property right that had been taken without just
compensation." The Court reasoned in part, however, that the
contractual right at issue was not one over which the State had any
bargaining power." Rather, the Court viewed the provision in the
contract as only part of a larger regulatory program. 82 As such, the
Court held that the claimants had no vested right in the provision
and, thus, its elimination did not implicate the Fifth Amendment."
In 1987, in Bowen v. Gilliard, the Court again rejected a takings
challenge by holding that the plaintiff had not been deprived of
any vested rights." The case involved a federal law that required
any custodial parent entitled to support payments from a noncus-
todial parent to assign the right to receive those payments to the
state government if the state provided the family financial aid under
the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program ("AFDC"). 85
The plaintiff in Gilliard, who was receiving public assistance under
the program, sued for the right to be able to collect her entire
allotted AFDC benefit as well as the full amount of the child support
she received for her youngest child." In reaching its decision, one
factor the Court considered was whether the child receiving the
support payments held a reasonable expectation that such payment
would continue. 87 After noting that a judicial decree or legislative
act could modify the support payment, the Court concluded that
the child did not have a vested expectation that payments would
continue in the same manner. 88 Thus, the Court held that the right
78
 Id. at 48.
38 Id. Congress was concerned about a number of factors, including the recent number
of withdrawals from the Social Security system. Id. at 47-48.
88
 Id. at 49.
ei Id. at 55.
82 Id.
83 Id. The Court also indicated that the provision was not a vested property right because
Congress had expressly reserved the power to amend or repeal any provision of the prior
law. See id.
84 483 U.S. 587, 607 (1987).
85/d, at 591.
" Id. The state had automatically deducted the amount of the support payment in excess
of $50.00 from the plaintiff's monthly allowance. Id. at 591, 607.
' 7 See id. at 607.
88 Id. at 607-08.
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to the support payments was outside the scope of property pro-
tected by the Fifth Amendment. 89
Thus, the United States Supreme Court has not provided any
single definition of property under the first prong of the Takings
Clause analysis. 9° In some cases the Court has focused on tangible
parcels of land, yet it has not made clear what boundaries apply, 9 '
In other cases, the Court has focused on intangible property. 92 In
the category of intangible property, the Court has found valid prop-
erty interests in economic rights93 and has held that legal rights
must be vested in order to be property for Takings Clause pur-
poses." The Court's numerous definitions of property unfortu-
nately make it difficult to predict what definition will apply in a
future takings case.95
II. THE SECOND PRONG OF THE TAKINGS ANALYSIS—DETERMINING
WHEN COMPENSATION IS REQUIRED
(71his Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any "set
formula" for determining when "justice and fairness" require that
economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the
government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated
on a few persons. 96
Commentators divide the United States Supreme Court cases
that comprise the compensation analysis of the regulatory takings
doctrine into three groups. 97 The first group are those historical
cases decided before 1922, where the Court developed the public
Au See id. at 608.
" Peterson, supra note 18, at 1304.
91 Compare Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978)
(property is entire parcel of land) with Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
458 U.S. 419, 438 (1982) (property can be a small portion of a larger tangible thing).
" See Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. at 607 (child support payments); Bowen v. Public
Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 55 (1986) (contract termi-
nation provision); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984) (trade secrets);
Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980) (interpleader fund);
United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945) (tenancy).
" See Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1003-04 (trade secrets); Webb's, 449 U.S. at 161 (inter-
pleader fund); General Motors, 323 U.S. at 377-78 (tenancy).
94 See Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. at 609 (child support payments); Bowen v. Public
Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment, 477 U.S. at 55 (contract termination
provision).
" Peterson, supra note 18, at 1308.
" Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (Brennan, J.,
opinion of the Court).
" See generally Large, supra note 3, at 6; Lawrence, supra note 6, at 394.
808	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 33:797
nuisance exception to the compensation requirement.98
 The second
group includes the landmark 1922 case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon and the cases that followed until the 1986-87 Term, where
the Court began to analyze takings cases under a number of differ-
ent theories. 99
 The third group is comprised of the cases decided
during the 1986-87 Term, where the Court attempted to clarify
the takings doctrine.' 80
A. Cases Prior to 1922
United States Supreme Court cases prior to 1922 indicated that,
despite severe economic damage to private property, no taking
occurred if the government had a valid public purpose for the
challenged law and the government had not physically trespassed
on the land.un For example, in 1887, in Mugler v. Kansas, the Su-
preme Court held that no taking occurred when the government
prevented a landowner from causing a detriment to the public. 182
In that case, the people of Kansas approved an amendment to the
state constitution that prohibited the manufacture and sale of in-
toxicating liquors in the state except for medical, scientific and
mechanical purposes.'" The state legislature subsequently passed
an act to give effect to that amendment, declaring, in part, that
places that manufactured liquor were public nuisances.t° 4 As a result
of the legislation the plaintiff's building, which he had specially
" See Large, supra note 3, at 6; see also Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 411 (1915);
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887).
" See Large, supra note 3, at 10; see also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 438 (1982) (physical invasion effects a taking); Penn Central, 438 U.S.
at 124 (determining when a taking occurs is an ad hoc factual inquiry); Miller v. Schoene,
276 U.S. 272, 279-80 (1928) (no taking if the regulation protects a public interest greater
than the private interest); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (dimin-
ution in value of property must be considered).
See Large, supra note 3, at 35; see also Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S.
825, 837 (1987); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304, 322 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. Dellenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 501-
02 (1987).
'°' Large, supra note 3, at 8-9.
1 " 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887). See also the cases prior to Mugler, including U.S. v.
Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 474 (1903) (flooding of property by government dam constituted taking
when land became a valueless bog); Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 181
(1871) (flooding of property was a taking where usefulness of land was destroyed or im-
paired); Commonwealth v. Tewksbury, 52 Mass. (11 Met.) 55, 57 (1846) (law prohibiting
removal of beach sand not a taking as it was only restraint on injurious use of property).
1°3 Id. at 655.
la Id.
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constructed and operated as a brewery for a number of years,
became worthless.'°5
Although the Mugler Court recognized that the plaintiff's prop-
erty had little value, the Court reasoned that a community may
prohibit uses that are deemed to be injurious to the health, morals
or safety of its members without effecting a taking.m° Such legisla-
tion, the Court observed, did not deprive the owner of the use of
the property for lawful purposes.'°' The Court acknowledged that
the public health, morals and safety could all be endangered by the
use of intoxicating drink; it therefore refused to usurp the decision
of the Kansas legislature.'° 8 Reiterating the proposition that all
property is held under the implied obligation that each owner's use
shall not be injurious to the public,' 0s the Court held that the
limitation on the plaintiff's use of his land did not constitute a
taking. 110
Similarly, in 1915, in Hadacheck v. Sebastian, the Court held that
the prevention of a noxious use under the police power did not
effect a taking."' The City of Los Angeles annexed land on which
the plaintiff had been operating a brickyard for a number of
years." 2 Once the land was part of the city, the city enforced an
ordinance prohibiting brickyards within city limits. "s Although the
Hadacheck Court noted that the action of a landowner cannot be
made a nuisance merely by an arbitrary or capricious legislative
determination," 4 it held, as it did in Mugler, that a landowner has
no property right in a nuisance. 15 The Court noted that although
the state cannot arbitrarily exercise its police power, prohibiting
,05 Id. at 657.
106 Id. at 668-69.
" 10 Id. at 669.
'°8 Id. at 662.
109 See id. at 665. For a general discussion of this proposition, see Frank 1. Michelman,
Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80
HARV. L. REV. 1165,1196-1201,1235-45 (1967); Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power,
74 YALE L.J. 36,38-39,48-50 (1964).
Mugler, 123 U.S. at 675.
111 239 U.S. 394,411 (1915).
112 Id. at 408.
" 3 See id. at 404. A state court convicted the owner of the brickyard of a misdemeanor
for violating the ordinance and the owner filed a petition in the state Supreme Court for a
writ of habeas corpus. Id, at 404-05. The court discharged the writ and remanded the
prisoner to custody. Id. at 405. A writ of error was subsequently granted by the United States
Supreme Court, Id.
" Id. at 410.
Id. at 410-11; see also Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623,668-69 (1887).
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brickyards within the limits of the city was clearly within the state's
power."6 Thus, the Court held that there was no taking." 7
B. Cases 1922-1987
Although the Supreme Court never explicitly rejected the nuis-
ance exception to the Takings Clause established in Mugler," 8 in
1922 the Court took regulatory takings jurisprudence in a new
direction as it began to consider the effect of the regulation on the
value of the land. 19 In that year, in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
the Court held that a state act prohibiting subsidence mining of coal
was a taking. 12° The act required mining companies to leave pillars
of coal behind to support the weight of the land above. 12 ' Writing
for the majority, Justice Holmes conceded that government did not
have to pay compensation every time property value was affected,' 22
but he noted that at some point the decline in value would cross a
line and become a taking of property.'" The Pennsylvania Coal
Court reasoned that if the government required a landowner to
leave some coal behind, it was as if the government had appropri-
ated or destroyed the coal.' 24 The Court held that in this case the
line had been crossed and the subsidence act was unconstitutional.' 25
Justice Brandeis dissented in Pennsylvania Coal, arguing that
the case involved the prevention of a nuisance. 126 In his opinion,
such a restriction, imposed to protect the public health, safety or
morals from danger, did not constitute a taking.'" Thus, he be-
lieved that the case should have been analyzed according to the
principle that there was no protectable property right in a public
116 Hadacheck, 239 U.S. at 411.
111 Id. at 411,414.
118 Lawrence, supra note 6, at 395. But see Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 134 n.30 (Brennan,
J.) (expressing some skepticism about the theory).
" 9 See Large, supra note 3, at 10-11.
129 260 U.S. 393,416 (1922).
121 See id. at 412-13.
'22 /d. at 413.
12' Id. at 415. Commentators have labeled this the diminution in value theory. See Large,
supra note 3, at 11; Sax, supra note 3, at 151.
124 Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 414.
In Id. at 416. The Court noted that it was also concerned that only one house was
affected by the statute, possibly indicating that the law was enacted to protect a private,
rather than a public, interest. Id. at 413.
196
 Id. at 417 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
147 Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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nuisance.' 28 Justice Brandeis would have held, under this theory,
that the legislation did not appropriate the land, but only prevented
the owner from using the land in a way that interfered with para-
mount rights of the public.' 29 Under this approach, he would have
found no taking.'"
The Pennsylvania Goal Court thus established that one factor
for consideration in a compensation analysis is the extent of dimin-
ution in the value of the property. 13 ' In subsequent cases, however,
the Court has not always adhered to this analysis.' 32 In 1928, in
Miller v. Schoene, the Court held that a Virginia law that mandated
that all diseased cedar trees be destroyed did not require compen-
sation to the owners of the trees.'" The State had enacted the
legislation to prevent the ultimate destruction of the State's nearby
apple orchards by the spread of the disease, a purpose the Court
held to be legitimate.' 34 Rather, than decide the case based on the
diminution in value of the plaintiff's property, the Court returned
to a nuisance type of analysis.'" Finally, the Court held that for a
legitimate public purpose, the State could destroy some property
interests without paying for them.'"
Then in 1978, in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City, the Court held that New York's landmark preservation legis-
lation did not effectuate a taking.' 37 The Court reasoned that the
building restrictions imposed by the law were substantially related
to the promotion of the general welfare and in addition permitted
the landowner to retain a reasonable beneficial use of the site.'"
Id. at 417-18 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668—
69 (1887).
129 See Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 417 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
th° Id. at 419 (Brandeis, J., dissenting),
°' See id. at 413 (diminution in value must be considered); see also Large, supra note 3,
at 16.
1S2 Large, supra note 3, at 16; see also Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 593-94
(1962) (application of nuisance theory); United States v. Central Eureka Mining, 357 U.S.
155, 168-69 (1958) (consideration of nature of invasion).
'" 276 U.S. 272, 280 (1928).
"4 Id. at 277.
1" See Large, supra note 3, at 16-17.
156 Miller, 274 U.S. at 277, 279.
157
	
U.S. 104, 138 (1977). See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of the facts of the case.
'" Id. The Court noted that another factor influencing its decision was that the city had
granted the landowner transfer development rights. Id. at 137. With these rights, the land-
owner would be able to develop at least one of eight other parcels of land located near the
site in question. Id.
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Thus, the landowner was denied compensation and the regulation
was upheld.'"
In reaching its decision, the majority of the Penn Central Court
noted that it had been unable to develop a standard formula to
determine when a compensable taking had occurred."° In the case,
however, the Court did identify several factors that had been ad-
dressed in the past, and stated that these factors carried particular
significance in determining whether compensation is required."'
The first factor the Court noted was the economic impact of the
regulation on the landowner."2 The second factor the Court iden-
tified was the extent to which the regulation interfered with invest-
ment-backed expectations. 143 The third factor the Penn Central
Court highlighted was the character of the government action.'"
The Court did not specify whether any one of these factors
was determinative of whether a compensable taking had occurred,
but rather indicated that the consideration of these factors was
essentially an ad hoc, factual inquiry. 145 The Court then applied
these factors to the case before it. 146
 The Court accepted the land-
owner's argument that the landmark law burdened some property
owners more than others. 147 The Court refused, however, to accept
the argument that this diminution in property value was alone
sufficient to effect a taking. 148 Instead, the Court held that legisla-
tion designed to promote the general welfare must commonly bur-
' 39 See id. at 138.
"0 See id. at 124.
'4' Id.
"2 Id. In identifying this factor, the Court cited Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590,
594 (1962), and recognized that there is no set formula to apply to determine how much of
an economic impact will lead to a taking. Id.
143 Id. Although the Court again cited to Goldblatt for this factor, commentators have
suggested that the Court drew the term not from a prior opinion but from an article written
by Frank Michelman. See, e.g., Richard G. Wilkins, The Takings Clause: A Modern Plot for an
Old Constitutional Tale, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 23 n.158 (1989). Michelman wrote in 1967
that the takings test established in Pennsylvania Coal was whether claimant was deprived of a
"distinctly perceived, sharply crystallized, investment-backed expectation." Michelman, supra
note 109, at 1233.
'" Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. The Court noted that this third factor means that a
taking may be more readily found when the governmental interference is a physical en-
croachment on the land than when a public program is adjusting the benefits and burdens
of economic life to promote the common good. Id.
14° Id.; see also United States v. Central Eureka Mining Go., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958)
(presence of one factor is not necessarily a taking); United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S.
149, 156 (1952) (each case must be judged on its own facts).
1d6
 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124-38.
197 Id. at 133.
'" Id. at 131.
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den some persons more than others and thus held that no taking
occurred. 149
Justice Rehnquist dissented from the majority opinion in Penn
Central. 15° While acknowledging that the government can prevent a
property owner from using the property in a way that may injure
others, he argued that the nuisance exception is not coterminous
with the police power itself.'" Under the facts of Penn Central, he
asserted, no nuisance was being prohibited.' 52 Thus, according to
Justice Rehnquist, the government should have compensated the
landowner for its loss.'"
Since Penn Central, the Court has seldom singled out any one
of these factors to decide a case, but rather has continued to weigh
the factors as a group. 154 In 1980, however, in Agins v. City of Tiburon,
the United States Supreme Court applied a specific two-part test
and held that a zoning law effects a taking only if the ordinance
does not advance legitimate state interests or it denies an owner
economically viable use of the land.' 55 In that case, the landowners
had acquired five acres of unimproved land intending to develop
the land for residential purposes.' 55 After the acquisition, the city
adopted a zoning ordinance that limited residential development
on the parcel to between one and five single-family homes.'" With-
out seeking administrative relief under the zoning ordinance, the
landowner brought suit claiming that the land had been taken.' 58
The Court reasoned, however, that while development was limited,
the landowner could still make use of the land and no fundamental
attribute of ownership had been extinguished.' 59 Thus, the Court
held that there was no taking.' 6°
1 " 9 Id. at 133, 135.
15° See id. at 138-53 (Rehnquist, J., disienting).
151 Id. at 144-45 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
152 Id. at 145 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
'S 5 See id. at 152 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist would have remanded the
case to the lower court to determine if the transfer development rights provided full com-
pensation. Id.
454 Lawrence, supra note 6, at 399; see also PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447
U.S. 74, 84 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979).
155 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). Although the language in the Agins opinion is similar to
that in Penn Central, the Agins Court used the word "or': to separate the factors. See id. This
would seem to indicate that an "either/or" test applied in Agins, rather than the Penn Central
balancing test. Peterson, supra note 18, at 1328.
156 Agins, 447 U.S. at 257.
' 51 Id.
"8 Id. at 257-58.
159 See id. at 262.
16° Id. at 262-63.
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Although the Court did not indicate whether the two-part Agin,s
test established a clear rule to be applied to takings cases,' 6 ' there
is one area of takings law where the Court has explicitly attempted
to provide a bright-line rule.'" The Court has frequently found a
taking when the government physically invades property or expro-
priates it for the government's own use.'" In 1982, in Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., the Court held that when a
public body causes a permanent physical occupation of private
property, there is, per se, a taking.' 84 The case involved the instal-
lation of a cable wire and related equipment on an apartment
building owned by the plaintiff.'" The Court concluded that be-
cause the government had taken the area actually occupied by the
cable facilities, it was required to pay just compensation.' 66
Thus, prior to the 1986-87 Term, the Court had approached
takings cases in several different ways.' 87 The historical nuisance
doctrine articulated in Mugler was never abandoned by the Court;' 68
instead, the Court added to takings jurisprudence with the dimin-
ution in value theory from Pennsylvania Coal, 169 the multi-factor
balancing test of Penn Central,'" and a rearticulation of the factors
of the balancing test in Agins.'" Moreover, in Loretto, the Court
indicated that regulations that cause a physical intrusion by the
government are, per se, a taking.'"
161
 Peterson, supra note 18, at 1328.
162 Id. at 1333.
163 Id.; Michelman, supra note 109, at 1184 (physical invasion is the one incontestable
case for compensation); see also United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264-65 (1946) (low
flying aircraft constitutes taking); United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 474 (1903) (flooding
constitutes taking); cf. United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168-69
(1958) (no taking of gold mines when government did not take physical possession); United
States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 155 (1952) (no taking when property was destroyed to
prevent enemy capture and was not actually appropriated for subsequent use).
164
 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982). See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of the facts of the case.
163 See id. at 421-22.
' 66 Id. at 438, 44 I.
167 See Large, supra note 3, at 35.
168 Lawrence, supra note 6, at 395.
168 See supra notes 119-31 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 137-54 and accompanying text.
"I See supra notes 155-60 and accompanying text.
12 See supra notes 161-66 and accompanying text.
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C. Cases Decided During the 1986-87 Term
In the 1986-87 Term, the United States Supreme Court sought
to redefine various aspects of takings jurisprudence.'" The first
major consideration of the takings issue in the term was in Keystone
Bituminous Coal Association v, DeBenedictis, where the Court held that
a subsidence mining statute, similar to the one found to be uncon-
stitutional in Pennsylvania Coal, 174 did not effect a taking of private
property for which compensation was required.'" The Keystone
Court distinguished its case from Pennsylvania Coal on two
grounds.'" First, although the Pennsylvania Coal Court held that its
statute had a limited public purpose,'" the Keystone Court held that
the subsidence mining act before it had a valid public purpose.'"
The act prevented mining that caused subsidence to public build-
ings, homes or cemeteries.'" Thus, the Keystone Court held the
purpose of the act to be the valid prevention of a public nuisance.'"
The second distinguishing factor between Pennsylvania Coal and
Keystone was the manner in which the Court measured the dimin-
ution in value of the property. 181 Although the Keystone Court relied
on the same basic test enunciated in Pennsylvania Coal, the Keystone
Court measured the plaintiff's percentage loss differently. 182 Rather
than focusing on what the mining company was required to leave
behind, the Keystone Court looked at what percentage of coal the
company retained. 183 Because only two percent of the total amount
of coal had to be left behind to prevent subsidence, and the owner
I" See Large, supra note 3, at 35. For an in-depth discussion of the cases decided that
term, see generally Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 CoLum. L. REV. 1600 (1988).
174 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,412-13 (1922).
l76
	
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,501-02 (1986).
' 7" See id. at 485,493.
'" Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413-14 (the statute appeared to be aimed at the
protection of only one home).
1" Keystone, 480 U.S. at 485.
119 Id. at 476.
1 " Id. at 485-86. The Court expressly held that Mugler and related decisions had survived
Pennsylvania Coal. See id. at 488-90. One author has argued that by discussing the nuisance
exception in a modern case, the Court extended the nuisance theory to cover areas of
contemporaneous concern and regulation. Lawrence, supra note 6, at 408.
Keystone, 480 U.S. at 493.
182 See id. at 493-502. In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), the Court
measured diminution in value by focusing on the coal that the statute required the landowner
to leave in place. Id. at 414. Because the government required the landowner to leave some
coal behind, the Pennsylvania Coal Court reasoned that it was as if the government had
appropriated or destroyed the coal. Id.
I" Keystone, 480 U.S at 498-99.
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could mine the rest, the Keystone Court noted that the landowner
retained economic use of the land. 184 Thus, the Court held that
there was no taking.' 85
In a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist advanced two
theories of takings analysis not addressed by the majority in the
five-four decision.' 8° First, he stated that the reliance on the nuis-
ance exception in this case was misplaced.' 87 The Chief Justice
argued that the previous nuisance cases served "discrete and narrow
purposes." 188 He maintained, however, that the statute in Keystone
was based essentially on an economic concern rather than on public
safety.'" Moreover, he asserted that the nuisance exception should
not be allowed to completely extinguish a property interest or pro-
hibit all use of a property interest.'"
Second, the Chief Justice asserted that the coal left in the
ground should be viewed as a separate parcel of property containing
a "separable property interest,"' 81 The Chief Justice argued that
because the statute stripped the plaintiff of a portion of its rights
in the coal, the subsidence act should have been held to be a taking
that required compensation.' 92 Thus, the question of what unit of
property a takings inquiry should focus on was an issue debated by
the Keystone Court.'"
In the second major takings case of the 1986-87 Term, First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, the
United States Supreme Court held that the government must com-
pensate landowners for temporary regulatory takings.'" The re-
striction at issue in the case was a county flood plain ordinance that
' 94 Id. at 498-99.
185 Id.
186 See id. at 506-21 (Rehnquist, CT, dissenting).
187 1d. at 512 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
188 /d. at 513 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Although Chief Justice Rehnquist did not
explicitly define this phrase, he did cite to three particular cases. Id. The Chief Justice cited
to Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962), in which the Court upheld an ordinance
prohibiting, for safety reasons, excavation of a lake. Id. at 596. He also cited to Hadacheck
v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915), where the Court held that the city of Los Angeles could
prohibit the operation of brickyards within the city limits without compensating the land-
owners. Id. at 411. Finally, the Chief Justice cited to Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887),
where the Court upheld a state law that prohibited the manufacture of intoxicating beverages
even though the plaintiff's land was rendered worthless by the statute. Id. at 667-69,675.
leg
 Keystone, 480 U.S. at 513 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
1" See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
191 Id. at 517 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
192 Id. at 520-21 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
19' Lawrence, supra note 6, at 415.
194
 482 U.S. 304,307 (1986).
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prohibited the redevelopment of areas devastated by previous storm
runoff.'y6 The plaintiff, a church, owned a camp for handicapped
children that was destroyed in the flood." 6 Because the ordinance
prevented the church from rebuilding, the church filed suit. 197
Although at least one commentator has noted that there was
no federal constitutional issue properly before the Supreme Court
in First English, the Court nevertheless took this opportunity to
decide the issue of temporary takings. 198 For the purposes of the
opinion, the Court assumed that the ordinance had denied the
plaintiff all use of its property for a considerable time period. 199
Thus, the Court concluded that even if the county were to subse-
quently repeal the legislation, it had to pay the landowner fair
market value for the time the regulation was in effect. 2"
The next takings case before the Court during the 1986-87
Term was Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, where the Supreme
Court held that the state's attempt to acquire beach access through
the use of an exaction was invalid. 201 In Nollan, the landowners
sought a development permit for their coastal property, but the
Commission informed them that in order to acquire the permit they
would have to allow the public a lateral easement along the beach. 202
According to the Court, however, there was not a sufficient nexus
between the condition imposed by the Commission, lateral beach
access, and the request of the landowners, to build a larger home. 2°5
The Court held that without this nexus, the Commission must
compensate the Nollans for the easement. 204
198 1d.
19814.
187
198 See Lawrence, supra note 6, at 426. Neither of the courts below had held that the
complaint properly alleged a taking under federal or state law. Id. For a discussion of other
plausible bases upon which the Court could have refused to hear the case, see id. at 426-27.
199 First English, 482 U.S. at 321.
Id. After the Court remanded the case for further proceedings, the lower court found
that there was no taking. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles,
210 Cal. App. 3d 1353, 1374 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
211 See 483 U.S. 825, 841-42 (1987).
209 Id. at 828.
2G3 Id. at 837.
2" Id. Because of the Court's inquiry into the effectiveness of the governmental condition
attached to the permit, some commentators have argued that the Court is embarking on a
course of heightened scrutiny for land use regulation. See Craig A. Peterson, Land Use
Regulatory "Takings" Revisited: The New Supreme Court Approaches, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 335, 338
(1988); The Supreme Court, 1986 Term—Leading Cases, 101 HARV. L. REV. 119, 245-50 (1987).
In 1988, however, the Court in Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988), held a takings
challenge to a rent control ordinance to be premature. Id. at 9-10. At issue in Pennell was a
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Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented from the
holding in Nollan. 205 Justice Brennan argued that the police power
included the authority to impose conditions on private develop-
ment.206 Thus, he asserted, the requirement of a "precise fit" be-
tween the burden on the developer and asserted needs of the Com-
mission would hamper the ability of the Commission to fulfill its
"public trust mandate." 207 Moreover, Justice Brennan argued, the
public's expectation of access existed before any expectation of
private development evolved. 208
Justices Stevens and Blackmun each dissented in a separate
opinion. 289 Neither of the Justices disagreed with Justice Brennan's
opinion that the restriction on the Nollan's right to obtain the
development permit was a valid use of the police power. 21 ° Justice
Blackmun characterized the majority's interpretation of the nexus
between the condition and the permit as "rigid."2 " Justice Stevens
explicitly agreed with Justice Brennan's opinion that state agencies
must have flexibility to deal with the conflict between private prop-
erty interests and the preservation of our natural resources. 212
The other takings cases decided by the United States Supreme
Court during the 1986-87 Term did not gain the widespread at-
tention of the three cases above."' In United States v. Cherokee Nation
of Oklahoma, the Court held that Congress's power over the im-
"tenant hardship" clause that allowed a hearing officer to consider the effect a rent increase
would have on a tenant. Id. at 4. The landlords argued that consideration of the hardship
to the tenants reduced the rents below an objectively reasonable amount and therefore
constituted a taking. Id. at 9. The Pennell Court, however, found no evidence that the clause
had ever been used to reduce rents below the figure that would have been set based on other
factors in the ordinance. Id. at 9-10. The Court reasoned that constitutionality should be
judged only in an actual factual setting that makes such a decision necessary. Id. at 10. Thus,
the Court found the claim to be premature. Dissenting in Pennell, Justice Scalia argued,
however, that the fact that the landlords were not able to show specific harm was not enough
to prevent consideration of the claim on the merits. See id. at 18-19 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
He asserted that this inability was no reason to shield the "alleged constitutional injustice"
from judicial scrutiny. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
ns See Nolan, 483 U.S. at 842-64 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
5°6 Id. at 843 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
2" Id. at 847 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
n2 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
2® Id. at 865-66 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), 866-67 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
510 Id. at 865-66 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), 867•(Stevens, J., dissenting).
211 Id, at 865 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
212 Id: at 867 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
212 See, e.g., Large, supra note 3, at 35 (referring to Keystone, First English and Nolan as
the three significant cases of the term); Lawrence, supra note 6, at 392 (referring to Keystone,
First English and Nolan as the three most heralded takings cases of the term).
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provement of navigable waters precluded a taking by the exercise
of those powers.214 In that case, an Indian tribe claimed that a
government waterways project that altered a channel in the Arkan-
sas River had impermissibly damaged, and thus taken, gravel de-
posits in a portion of the bed to which the tribe held title. 213 The
Court reasoned, however, that ownership of riverbed property did
not include the right to be free from congressional exercise of the
navigational power. 216 Thus, the Court created a categorical excep-
tion, like the Mugler nuisance exception, to the compensation prong
of the takings test. 2 ' 7
In sum, rather than clarify existing takings jurisprudence dur-
ing the 1986-87 Term, the Court added several new considerations
to a takings analysis. 218 The Court held that a governmental permit
condition imposed on a landowner must be reasonably related to
the action by the landowner who requires the permit. 219 The Court
also held that even a temporary taking must be compensated. 22° In
addition, the Court failed to overrule the Mugler noxious use or
nuisance exception22 ' and added a new categorical exception to the
compensation requirement. 222 Moreover, the Court decided some
cases with language reminiscent of the Penn Central balancing test. 223
Therefore, it is arguable whether the takings doctrine was in fact
clarified during the term. 224
214 480 U.S. 700, 703-04 (1987).
415 1d. at 701.
216 See id. at 706.
2" See id. at 705 (indicating that no balancing test is required); see also Lawrence, supra
note 6, at 433-34.
218 See Peterson, supra note 18, at 1304.
419 Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
22° First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304,
307 (1987).
221
 Lawrence, supra note 6, at 395; see also Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City,
438 U.S. 104, 125 (1978) (recognizing that land use regulations enacted for public welfare
may adversely affect property interest); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413
(1922) (noting that damage was not a public nuisance). But see Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 134
n.30 (Brennan, J.) (expressing some skepticism about the theory).
222 See United States v. Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, 480 U.S. 700, 703-04 (1987)
(navigational right-of-way precludes taking).
822 See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 490 (1987)
(nature of state action); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986, 1010 (1984) (investment-
backed expectation); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979) (investment-
backed expectation).
22"
	 Peterson, supra note 18, at 1304 ("difficult to imagine a body of case law in greater
doctrinal and conceptual disarray").
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III. THE CURRENT CONTROVERSY: LUCAS V. SOUTH CAROLINA
COASTAL COUNCIL
Although the regulatory takings question is a complex one, and
although regulations affecting coastal property are especially
problematic, this appeal presents . . . a relatively straightforward
issue. 225
David Lucas purchased his two vacant oceanfront lots in late
1986. 226
 He intended to build a house on each piece of property,
one for his family and one as an investment for resale. 227 A year
and a half later, in July of 1988, Sobth Carolina passed its Beach-
front Management Act ("Act"). 228 The Act authorized the South
Carolina Coastal Council to establish a baseline along the shore of
the beich in front of which no new construction would be permit-
ted.229
 The Council drew the lines behind Mr. Lucas's property,
thereby prohibiting the construction of any permanent structure on
the property with the exception of a small deck or walkway. 23°
Mr. Lucas brought suit against the South Carolina Coastal
Council in the Court of Common Pleas claiming that the restrictions
on the use of his property constituted a taking without just corn-
225 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895,896 (S.C.) (Taal,., opinion
of the court), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 436 (1991).
226
 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404
S.E.2d 895 (S.C.), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 436 (1991) (No. 91-453),
227 Id.
226 S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-10 to -360 (Law. Co-op 1987 & Supp. 1991). The Act
included detailed legislative findings regarding the coastal beach and dune system. See id.
§ 48-39-250. Among these findings was the determination that "[a) long-range comprehen-
sive beach management plan is needed for the entire coast of South Carolina to protect and
manage effectively the beach/dune system, thus preventing unwise development and mini-
mizing man's adverse impact on the system." Id. § 48-39-250(11). Moreover, the Act con-
tained an explicit policy statement establishing the state's goal of preserving the beach/dune
system as "a buffer from tides, storm surge, hurricanes, and normal erosion." Id. § 48-39-
260(1)(a). One commentator recognized the Act almost immediately as both innovative and
a potentil problem under the takings clause. See Natasha Zalkin, Comment, Shifting Sands
and Shifting Doctrines: The Supreme Court's Changing Takings Doctrine and South Carolina's Coastal
Zone Statute, 79 CAL. L. REV. 205,208-09 (1991) (describing the Act as a revolutionary coastal
management act with several controversial provisions).
2" S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-280,48-39-290 (Law. Co-op 1987 & Supp. 1991).
2" Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 896,896 (S.C.), cert. granted, 112
S. Ct. 436 (1991). The South Carolina Coastal Council has argued that Mr. Lucas's claim is
not ripe for adjudication because the Beachfront Management Act was subsequently amended
to allow a landowner in Mr. Lucas's position to apply for a permit to build a more permanent
structure. See Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 8-12, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 404 S.E.2d 896, cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 436 (1991) (No. 91-453). The issue of
ripeness, however, is outside the scope of this note.
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pensation. 23 ' The lower court agreed and awarded him
$1,232,387.50 as just compensation for the regulatory taking. 232 In
an opinion by Justice Toal, the South Carolina Supreme Court
reversed the lower court decision, holding that the regulation was
a valid exercise of the state's police power and did not go so far as
to constitute a taking. 233
The South Carolina Supreme Court recognized that the United
States Supreme Court has never articulated a set formula to deter-
mine when a taking has occurred and thus a court's determination
of whether compensation is required must be a fact-specific one. 234
The state court did acknowledge, however, that there are certain
factors that courts generally consider. 235 These factors include: (1)
the economic impact of the regulation; (2) the regulation's interfer-
ence with the landowner's investment-backed expectations; (3) the
physical 'impact of the invasion; and (4) the nature of the state's
interest in the regulation. 236 Moreover, the Lucas court noted that
in some situations certain factors may deserve more weight than
others and in some cases may be determinative. 237 One such situa-
tion, the court noted, is when the regulation exists to prevent serious
public harm. 238 The court then held that the Beachfront Manage-
ment Act prevented a serious harm to the public.239 Thus, the Lucas
court concluded that in this case, the purpose of the Act was deter-
minative in the compensation analysis and the Act did not effect a
taking of Mr. Lucas's property. 240
Justice Harwell, joined by Justice Chandler, dissented from the
Lucas decision. 241 Justice Harwell argued that to allow such an in-
251 Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 896.
"2 Id.
2" Id. at 899.
22' Id. at 898-99.
295 Id. at 899.
°6 Id.
232 Id.
232 Id. Another example cited by the Lucas court is the fact that the United States Supreme
Court has "invariably found a taking when the government regulation is characterized as a
permanent physical invasion." Id.
2" Id. The court, in fact, found that because Mr. Lucas had not challenged the public
purpose of the act, he had in fact conceded that the Beachfront Management Act prevented
a public harm. Id. at 900. Mr. Lucas, however, denied this concession and conceded only that
land use regulations are a rightful exercise of the state's police power. See Petitioner's Brief
on the Merits at 10, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C.), cert.
granted, 112 S. Ct. 436 (1991) (No. 91-453).
24° See Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 899.
243 See id. at 902-08 (Harwell, J., dissenting).
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terpretation of the Mugler nuisance exception would grant "carte
blanche" to government agencies to regulate private property. 242
Moreover, he argued that none of the stated purposes of the Beach-
front Management Act could be labeled the prevention of a nuis-
ance.243 He asserted, therefore, that because Mr. Lucas's property
had no fair market value, the state must compensate him. 244
Mr. Lucas subsequently filed a Petition for Rehearing with the
South Carolina Supreme Court. 245 The petition was denied on June
17, 1991. 246 The United States Supreme Court granted Mr. Lucas's
Petition for Certiorari on November 18, 1991. 247
IV. ANALYZING THE APPROACH OF THE COURT: BALANCING TEST
VERSUS BRIGHT-LINE APPROACH
[B]alancing—or, better, the judicial practice of situated judgment
or practical reason—is not law's antithesis but a part of law's
essence. 248
One commentator has referred to takings jurisprudence as a
"gravitational center" with four planetary bodies of regulations cir-
cling 11. 249 The first type of regulation is one that involves an actual
physical invasion, penetration or occupation by the government. 25°
The second is a government action designed to protect life or
property from a noxious use or public nuisance. 251 The third is
comprised of government regulations for general zoning pur-
poses. 252
 The final group consists of those actions tied to public
242 Id. at 906 (Harwell, J., dissenting).
245 Id. (Harwell, J., dissenting).
244 Id. at 907 (Harwell, J., dissenting).
245 Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 9, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404
S.E.2d 895 (S.C.), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 436 (1991) (No. 91-453).
246 Id.
247
 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C.), cert. granted, 112 S.
Ct. 436 (1991) (No. 91-453).
249
 Michelman, supra note 173, at 1629.
249 Bruce W. Burton, Predatory Municipal Zoning Practices: Changing the Presumption of
Constitutionality in the Wake of the "Takings Trilogy," 44 ARK. L. REV. 65, 79 (1991).
259 Id. at 81; see also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426
(1982) (cable wire); U.S. v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 474 (1903) (flooding of property).
251 Burton, supra note 249, at 84; see also Miller y. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 280 (1928)
(diseased cedar trees); Hadacheck v, Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 411 (1915) (brickyard); Mugler
v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887) (brewery); cf. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485-87 (1987) (subsidence mining).
252 Burton, supra note 249, at 85. See generally Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255
(1980); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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sensibilities such as historic landmark preservation or aesthetic or
cultural values. 253
The tests used by the Court to determine if compensation is
required in any of the above cases cannot be categorized quite so
easily. In some cases the Court has used language reminiscent of
the multi-factor balancing test introduced in Penn Central Transpor-
tation Co. v. New York City. 254 Yet in other cases, the Court has looked
for more of a bright-line exception to the compensation prong of
the Takings Clause. 255 In fact, some commentators argue that, more
and more, the Court has been leaning away from a balancing test
in favor of decisive, categorical answers. 256 The Court's previous
attempts, however, at creating bright-line exceptions to the com-
pensation requirement, such as the nuisance or noxious use excep-
tion, clearly show that an interest-balancing approach is prefer-
able.257
One of the first problems in creating a bright-line test is defin-
ing the limits or parameters of that test. For example, in the 1887
decision of Mugler v. Kansas, the United States Supreme Court
attempted to address the need for government regulatory action
against an individual on behalf of the public by holding that prop-
erty cannot be used in ways that are injurious to others. 258 By finding
the operation of a brewery to be a nuisance and therefore subject
to governmental regulation, 259 the Court may have believed that it
was defining a discrete category of "noxious" land uses or "nuis-
ances" that would be easily recognized by courts in the future. This
has not, however, been the case.
353 Burton, supra note 249, at 87; see also Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City,
438 U.S. 104, 107 (1978) (historic preservation).
334 See, e.g., Keystone, 480 U.S. at 490 (nature of state action); kuckelshaus v. Monsanto,
467 U.S, 986, 1010 (1984) (investment-backed expectation); Kaiser Aetna v. United States,
444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979) (investment-backed expectation).
255 See United States v. Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, 480 U.S. 700, 703-04 (1987)
(navigational right-of-way); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,
426 (1982) (physical invasion); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887) (nuisance).
In Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), the Court indicated that a regulation leaving no
economic use for the land will constitute a taking. Id. at 260. Although this appears to be
another bright-line test, the Court has held that when the purpose of the regulation is the
prevention of a public nuisance, compensation is not always required. See Keystone, 480 U.S.
at 492.
"See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 6, at 432; Michelman, supra note 173, at 1621-25.
257 See supra notes 101-17 and accompanying text for a discussion of the nuisance
exception.
233 123 U.S. 623, 655 (1887).
25a Id. at 671.
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After more than one hundred years, the Court has yet to define
the term "nuisance." 269 Without a clear definition, some lower courts
have limited the application of the nuisance concept to those land
uses that directly endanger the lives of human beings. 261 Other
courts have found that public harm must be more broadly defined
and encompass the notion of public welfare or interest as wel1. 292
Another problem associated with any clear rule is the rule's
failure to account for all conceivable situations. For example, the
United States Supreme Court has held that a public nuisance exists
in the operation of a brickyard, 263 the existence of diseased cedar
trees,264 and subsidence mining. 265 Despite these decisions, it is not
clear whether a government may prohibit subsidence mining where
there are no homes or cemeteries266 or whether diseased trees may
be destroyed without compensation if there is no apple orchard
within hundreds of miles.267 Nor is it clear whether the cedar trees
could be destroyed if only one apple tree was in danger. 268 No
definition of a nuisance can possibly account for all uses of land
that might be harmful, or even just annoying, to the public. •
The Court's inability to account for all possible scenarios leads
to differing interpretations of the rule by lower courts. 269 This
weakens the persuasiveness of two arguments that are commonly
made for a bright-line test: predictability and reduced litigation.
Land-use planners and governments are only able to guess whether
the activity they are prohibiting falls within the definitions of a
20
 The term "nuisance" is grounded in tort law yet, even in that context,•it is not a
concept that is easily grasped. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS,
§ 86 at 616-17 (5th ed. 1984) (nuisance may be a catchword used as a substitute for any
analysis of a problem).
261 See Empire Kosher Poultry, Inc. v. Hallowell, 816 F.2d 907, 914-16 (3rd Cir. 1987)
(government may regulate to prevent harm from disease).
262 See Carter v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 314 S.E.2d 327, 329 (S.C. 1984) (state
may regulate use of property to protect the public interest).
26S
	 Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 411 (1915).
264 See Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 280 (1928).
266 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485-87 (1987).
266 See id. at 476 (subsidence act prohibited mining that would cause damage to public
buildings, dwellings and cemeteries).
267 See Miller, 276 U.S. at 277 (order to cut down trees was to prevent spread of disease
to apple orchards in vicinity).
26'3 See id.
262 Compare Empire Kosher Poultry, Inc. v. Hallowell, 816 F.2d 907, 914-16 (3rd Cir.
1987) (government may regulate to prevent harm from disease) with Carter v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 314 S.E.2d 327, 329 (S.C. 1991) (state may regulate use of propeity to
protect the public interest).
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nuisance and any resulting dispute must then be resolved by the
courts. 27°
A third problem with a bright-line rule is particularly relevant
in the area of takings jurisprudence. Although takings claims are
raised in a number of situations, 271 many are based on land regu-
lations. Land-use regulation has generally been a matter of local
concern. 272 This is only natural, as the contours and the needs of
the land vary dramatically among regions. Even a state legislature
may not be in the best position to dictate how a local community
can best use its land.273 The creation of a number of bright-line
rules and exceptions to be applied in a takings case would effectively
strip some of this control from the local communities. A balancing
test, on the other hand, would allow the lower courts, those more
familiar with the circumstances of the particular case, to apply and
balance, with discretion, specific factors delineated by the United
States Supreme Court.
In evaluating a takings claim, a court must be willing to consider
explicitly the specific facts and interests involved in the case. A
bright-line approach, such as the nuisance exception to the com-
pensation requirement, ignores these interests. 274 A balancing ap-
2" Guessing is much more dangerous considering the United States Supreme Court's
decision in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles. 482 U.S. 304, 307
(1986). In that case, the Court held that even a temporary taking must be compensated. Id.
Thus, if a local government guesses incorrectly and a court later finds the action to constitute
a taking, the appropriate remedy no longer is just the repeal of the government action. See
id. The government must now compensate the landowner for the time the regulation was in
effect. Id.
2" See Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 213 (1986) (withdrawal
liability from pension fund); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986, 1001-03 (1984) (dis-
closure of trade secrets).
272 DAVID L. CALLIES & ROBERT H. FREILICH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND UsE 34
(1986).
273 The locating of group homes for the mentally disabled is one example of a land-use
regulation that may be more successful when some control is left to the local communities.
Some states have set forth broad policy statements regarding the siting of these homes and
the courts have allowed the local communities to retain some control over the exact placement
of the homes. See, e.g., Life Concepts, Inc. v. Harden, 562 So. 2d 726, 728 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1990) (town may deny home a special permit if certain factors are taken into account).
On the other hand, other states have preempted the possibility of the local communities
imposing their own zoning restrictions. See, e.g., MINN. STAT ANN. 462.357, subd. 7 (West
1991) ("A state licensed residential facility serving six or fewer persons shall be considered
a permitted single family residential use of property for the purposes of zoning,"). Although
either type of approach may result in the opening of a group home, giving the community
some control may ease fears and allow the local residents to feel that they have participated
in the decisionmaking process.
274 At least one commentator has argued that the bright-line rules play an important role
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proach, on the other hand, allows for each claim to be evaluated
on its merits. A court may then follow the Supreme Court's guiding
principle that "justice and fairness" must determine whether com-
pensation is required. 275
V. DEFINING THE BALANCING TEST TO REFLECT ALL INTERESTS
As a nation, the United States must come to an understanding
of why natural areas are important to its future. 276
Even concluding that a balancing test is preferable to a bright-
line approach does not solve the issue of what factors the Court
should consider in its balancing analysis. The public interest must
be considered along with the impact of the regulation on the private
interest. Although the Court has sketched an outline of a takings
test that reflects these interests, it has yet to refine and illuminate
the factors into a workable compensation analysis. 272
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, the Court
addressed three factors that should be considered in a compensation
analysis. 278 The first two, the economic impact of the regulation 279
and the interference with investment-backed expectations,2" seem
in takings jurisprudence. See Wiseman, supra note 4, at 465. This note does not dispute that
some takings cases might be decided under the rules. A balancing approach, however, should
also encompass these situations.
275 See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1977). One
commentator has suggested that the benefits of a balancing approach have been recognized
by the Court with regard to the Fourth Amendment. See Wilkins, supra note 143, at 25. The
Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures, a concept that was
limited, for some time, to physical invasions. Id; see also Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158,
158 (1964) (Clark, J., concurring) (actual physical intrusion required before search will be
found). In 1967, the Court abandoned physical intrusion as a constitutional threshold and
held instead that the Fourth Amendment applies whenever police investigatory activities
infringe on an expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable. Wilkins, supra
note 143, at 25; see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring). Thus, the Court moved from a mechanical rule to an explicit, if more difficult, analysis
of the core concerns underlying the constitutional amendment.. Wilkins, supra note 143, at
25. Professor Wilkins and this note argue that the benefits of a balancing approach are
appropriate for the Fifth Amendment takings cases as well. See id.
276 Douglas 0. Linden, New Directions for Preservation Law: Creating an Environment Worth
Experiencing, 20 Ellyn- L. 49, 51 (1990).
277 See Wilkins, supra note 143, at 23. Professor Wilkins proceeds from the same premise
as this note. See id. He asserts that the Court, in Penn Central, has sketched a sufficient outline
for a workable takings test. Id.
"" See id.
279 See 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1977).
480 See id.
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to account fully for the interests of the private party. The third
factor, however, the character of the government invasion, 28 ' seems
to have been lost over the years. Generally, the Court's inquiry on
this prong of the test has been reduced to whether or not the
government's action constitutes a physical invasion. 282 To read the
third factor in this manner fails, however, to account for the second
interest described above, that of the public."' Instead of focusing
on the physical character of the government action, the third factor
should include an explicit consideration of the public interest.
Much of the Court's reasoning in Penn Central, as well as in
subsequent cases, supports this call for a strengthened public inter-
est factor in a takings balancing test. 284 For example, in addition to
presenting the three factors for consideration in a takings case, the
Penn Central Court also discussed the underlying rationale for de-
termining when a government action constitutes a compensable
taking. The Court, while recognizing that finding a set formula was
difficult, noted that "justice and fairness" must determine when the
private party should be compensated. 285 Whether or not compen-
sation in any given circumstance is just or fair, however, should not
turn only on whether or not the government action involves a
physical invasion. Instead, the analysis should include a considera-
tion of exactly what harm the government is seeking to protect and
28 I See id.
282 Wilkins, supra note 143, at 23; see also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 438 (1982) (physical invasion is per se a taking). This narrow focus may
have developed from the language of the Penn Central opinion itself. See 438 U.S. at 124.
After indicating that the third factor to be considered is the character of the governmental
action, the Penn Central Court stated that a taking would be more readily found when the
interference by the government was a physical invasion. Id. Nothing in the Court's opinion,
however, commands that these two sentences be read together which would lead to a narrow
inquiry of whether a government action involves a physical invasion.
"3 See Wilkins, supra note 143, at 24. Professor Wilkins discusses the role of the public
interest in a balancing test built upon the Penn Central factors, but he does not argue that
the public interest should be a separate consideration. See id. Instead, he focuses on the
"average reciprocity of advantage between affected property owners and the public." Id.
Thus, within Professor Wilkins's "public interest factor" is an implicit consideration of the
private interest. See id. This note takes a different approach, however, and asserts that the
public interest should be a factor that stands alone and is considered independent from the
private interest. Otherwise, a true balancing test is impossible. Moreover, the approach taken
in this note is designed to lessen the constraint on government regulation by broadening the
consideration of the public interest. Professor Wilkins, on the other hand, wishes to see the
Penn Central factors reinvigorated to provide property owners with additional constitutional
protection and to constrain government action. See id.
"4 See id.
253 See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1977).
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how the benefits of that protection weigh against the harm to the
private interest. 286
Although the Penn Central Court began to recognize the neces-
sity for consideration of the public interest in a compensation anal-
ysis, the Court was also concerned that economic injuries caused by
public action might be borne disproportionately by only a few peo-
ple if no compensation was given. 287 The Court recognized, how-
ever, that whether a particular restriction will be rendered invalid
will be based on the particular circumstances of the case. 288 There-
fore, under the Penn Central principles, when the economic injury
is considered in context with the benefit of saving human lives,
economic injury seems trivial. 289 Fairness dictates that the govern-
ment should be permitted to save, without compensating for eco-
nomic harm, human lives that are clearly endangered.
The public interest has also been an explicit part of the takings
analysis since Penn Central.29° For example; in Keystone Bituminous
Coal Association v. DeBenedictis, the Court focused on the nature of
subsidence mining as a public nuisance in order to distinguish the
case from Pennsylvania Coal. 291 Although the Pennsylvania Coal Court
expressed concern that the subsidence mining act at issue in its case
did not protect the general public, but merely one homeowner, 292
the Keystone Court held that this statute prevented harm to the
general public from subsidence mining. 293 With such a holding, the
Keystone Court explicitly affirmed that this notion, that the prohib-
ition of a nuisance cannot be a taking, had survived later takings
decisions. 294
The Court also addressed the concept of public interest in
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission. 295 The Nollan Court's opinion
focused on the lack of a rational nexus between the permit sought
by the landowner and the condition attached to the permit. 296 Im-
2" Wilkins, supra note 143, at 26.
2" 438 U.S. at 124.
296
2" A philosophical discussion on the value of one human life versus one hundred is
outside the scope of this note.
299 See Wilkins, supra note 143, at 24.
291 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485-87 (1987).
292 See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
292 See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 895.
294 See Lawrence, supra note 6, at 407. Lawrence also suggests that this modern discussion
of an historical theory has extended the nuisance theory to cover additional areas of contem-
poraneous concern and regulation. See id. at 408.
295 See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 836 (1987).
2" See id. at 837.
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plicit in this discussion, however, was the notion that a condition
sufficiently tied to the permit would have been allowed. 297 The basis
for such a condition would have been the preservation of the pub-
lic's view of the beach. 298
A balancing approach will result in a continuum of results from
challenges to government actions that adversely affect property
owners. 299 The stronger the police power justification for a govern-
ment act, the more likely such an act will withstand a challenge
under the compensation prong of the Takings Clause. 30° For ex-
ample, one commentator has argued for consideration of the public
interest in floodplain regulation."' A prohibition on building in an
area categorized as a floodplain is designed to save the lives of the
hundreds of people who would build in the line of the flood without
such regulation."2 The commentator argued, therefore, that weigh-
ing private losses against the public interest in saving lives would
increase the likelihood that the consequences of the regulation
would be fair without compensation."
Moreover, not every action taken on behalf of the public's
health, safety or welfare will be justified. Floodline regulation, such
as that described above, might not be valid without compensation
in an area which floods only once every thousand years because the
public interest in safety would be much less compelling. In such a
case the burden on the private individual would be much more
likely to outweigh the benefit to the public.
Thus, in Penn Central, Keystone and Nollan, the Court seems to
have taken steps in the right direction. All that remains, therefore,
is for the Court to continue to develop its analysis. The public
interest does not end with the determination that the government
has a valid purpose in enacting the regulation. The public also has
an interest in determining whether compensation is required for
that action. One property owner's economic interest cannot be con-
"' See id. at 836.
293 See id.
299 Wilkins, supra note 143, at 27.
SLKI Id.
s"' See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, The Takings Issue in a Natural Setting: Floodiines and the Police
Power, 52 Tex. L. Ray. 201, 202 (1974).
3°2 See id. Professor Plater noted that the desire of landowners to build where their homes
might be destroyed by floods is based on aesthetic and economic concerns rather than notions
of danger. Id. at 207. Building in such an area, however, only exacerbates the problem
because each landowner is responsible for only a slight fraction of the increment in danger
and the benefits continue to outweigh the costs. Id.
303 /d. at 203.
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sidered as an isolated element; it must be considered with and
balanced against the public harm being prevented.
VI. APPLICATION OF THE TAKINGS TEST TO LUCAS V. SOUTH
CAROLINA COASTAL COUNCIL
Now, it's one thing to keep the neighborhood grocery store from
falling down a mine shaft. It's something the again to suggest
that if Mr. Lucas builds his house on the beach, the state of South
Carolina is going to erode and wash up somewhere in Nova
Scotia."4
The facts of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council present the
United States Supreme Court with an opportunity to refine the
takings test in a way that explicitly considers the public interest.
Under such an approach, the analysis of the two scenarios described
above would not be so different after all. Applying the two-part
takings test to the facts of Lucas will demonstrate that Mr. Lucas
may not have a property interest that is protected by the Fifth
Amendment. 905 Even assuming that he does, however, the second
part of the analysis demonstrates that the Beachfront Management
Act does not effect a compensable taking of Mr. Lucas's property."6
A. Mr. Lucas Does Not Have a Property Interest That is Protected by the
Fifth Amendment
The first question to be addressed in Lucas is whether the
landowner has a legitimate property interest that is protected by
the Fifth Amendment. 507 The Supreme Court has had difficulty in
3414 Property Owners Strike Back, WASH. Times, Nov. 19,1991, at F2.
"3 The parties did not argue this issue before the United States Supreme Court. See
Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 6-8, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d
895 (S.C.), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 436 (1991) (No. 91-453).
"5
 At the trial court, Mr. Lucas conceded that the purpose of the South Carolina Beach-
front Management Act, to preserve the state beaches as a valuable resource, was both valid
and proper. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895,896 (S.C.), cert. granted,
112 S. Ct. 436 (1991). Moreover, he failed to challenge the validity of the Act, thereby
acknowledging the Act as a rational method by which to achieve this purpose. See id. Those
issues then were not before the state supreme court, see id., nor are they before the United
States Supreme Court. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C.), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 436 (1991) (No. 91-453). The sole
issue presented in Lucas is whether this regulation goes too far and is thus a taking that must
be compensated. See id.
3" See supra notes 37-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of the definition of a
property interest that can be taken under the Fifth Amendment.
July 1992]	 TAKINGS	 831
explicitly defining the notion of property in the context of land
developments08 Some members of the Court have spoken of de-
velopment as an essential use and an attribute of property owner-
ship. 309 Others have regarded development expectations as legiti-
mate only if they are consistent with the public interests°
In 1887, in Mugler v. Kansas, the Court recognized the notion
that property cannot be developed without concern for the public
welfare. 3 " As such, the Court held that legislation prohibiting the
manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquor was a valid use of the
police powens" Thus, the Court recognized that the community
must be able to control the use of private property for the general
good and held that no taking arose from legislation prohibiting uses
injurious to the health, morals or safety of the community. 3 "
Over time, the Court reduced the public interest philosophy of
Mugler to a narrow nuisance exception and relied on it only spo-
radically to justify the prohibition of noxious uses without compen-
sation. 3 " Then in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,
the Court once again appeared willing to consider the principle of
social welfare when it upheld New York City's landmark preserva-
tion law. 3 " The majority reasoned that the restrictions on the land
were substantially related to the promotion of the general welfare
and permitted the landowner reasonable use of the land. 3 " In his
dissenting opinion in Penn Central, Justice Rehnquist, however,
sought to limit the applicability of the nuisance cases when he
argued that the exception should apply only to regulations that
506 For a further discussion of this topic, see Grayson P. Hanes and J. Randall Minchew,
On Vested Rights to Land Use and Development, 46 WASH. & LEE L. REV, 373 (1989).
"°° See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 512 (1987) (Rehn-
quist, C.J., dissenting); see also Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 833-34
n.2 (1987) (Scalia, J.)
''° See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 491 n.20 (Stevens, J.); see also Nollan, 483 U.S. at 864 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
3Il See 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887).
512 1d.
See id. at 668.
3" See Jerry L. Anderson, Takings & Expectations Toward a "Broader Vision" of Property
Rights, 37 KAN. L. REV. 529, 538 (1989). One court even went so far as to state that Mugler
"is no longer a correct statement of the law." Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 8 Ct. Cl.
160, 171 (1985), vacated in part, 791 F.2d 893 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1053
(1987). The nuisance exception to the takings doctrine was also somewhat hidden for a time
behind the holding of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), which intro-
duced the diminution in value test to determine if a taking had occurred. Id. at 415.
313 See 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1977).
316
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prohibit uses of land that actually endanger the community. 317
Thus, Justice Rehnquist did not consider the notion that land use
should be subject to society's general well-being at the expense of
the individual property owner." 8
In 1987, the Court reaffirmed the notion from Mugler that
states may regulate to prevent injury to the public without compen-
sating the property owner. 319 In Keystone Bituminous Coal Association
v. DeBenedictis, the Court upheld a subsidence statute prohibiting
mining that destroyed the surface support. 32° By declaring that no
individual has the right to use his property in a way that harms
others, the Court concluded that the state had not taken anything
when it prohibited subsidence mining. 321 Again, as in Penn Central,
Justice Rehnquist dissented. 322 He argued that the scope of the
nuisance exception should be restricted to instances of misuse or
illegal use. 323 Thus, in his view, certain uses of land are inherent
rights and cannot be restricted without compensation. 324
The Court most recently attempted to resolve the issue of land
development in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission. 325 In that
case, the landowners challenged the right of the state to require
them to grant the state an easement along their beachfront property
in order to obtain a building permit. 326 The Court held that there
was not a sufficient nexus between the permit sought and the con-
dition attached to it. 327 Therefore, the Court held that the state had
to pay for the easement in order to obtain it. 328
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, called Justice Brennan's
dissenting proposition that a state can define the limits of property
rights "peculiar,"329 even though the Court has stated that a state
5 " See id, at 145-46 (Rehnquist, J., dissen
313 See id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
313 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
no Id.
3" See id. at 491 n.20. In finding that no
also considered whether the property had
("fAllthough public interest in preventing the
a decision on that alone.").
322 See id. at 506-21 (Rehnquist, C.J., disse nting).
323 1d. at 512 (Rehnquist, Cj., dissenting).
324 See id. (Rehnquist, Cj., dissenting).
329 See 483 U.S. 825, 841-42 (1987).
326 Id. at 828.
3" Id. at 837.
928 Id.
M a at 833 n.2.
ting).
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491 (1987).
compensable taking had occurred, the Court
suffered a diminution in value. Id. at 492
nuisance was substantial ... we need not rest
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can do so."° Moreover, Justice Scalia stated simply that the right to
build on one's own property cannot be considered a "governmental
benefit.""' Thus, Justice Scalia's point of view tends to support the
proposition that the right to develop one's property is an inherent
right.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented from the
holding in Nollan. 332 Justice Brennan found Justice Scalia's position
on the right to build "curious." 3" He disagreed with the argument
that the right to build on one's own property had a "privileged
natural rights status." 334 Justice Brennan asserted that the Nollans
were on notice that the right to develop their property could be
subject to government restrictions . 3"
Justices Stevens and Blackmun each dissented in separate opin-
ions.336 Both Justices agreed with Justice Brennan that the restric-
tion on the right of the Nollans to obtain the development permit
was a valid use of the police power.337 Justice Stevens went one step
further, however, and explicitly agreed that state agencies must have
flexibility to deal with the conflict between private property interests
and the preservation of our natural resources. 338
These arguments regarding expectations and the right to de-
velop private property really represent only a new version of an
argument that has existed since Pennsylvania Coal: whether all the
rights that are attached to property, such as the right to develop,
must be viewed together as a single right for Takings Clause pur-
"6 See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (property interests are
defined by rules that stem, not from the Constitution, but from independent sources such
as state law).
661 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834 n.2. The case relied on by Justice Brennan was Ruckelshaus
v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986 (1984), where the Court held that a federal law requiring a
company to disclose trade secrets in order to obtain a government permit to manufacture a
pesticide was not a taking. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 858. Justice Brennan, in Nollan, reasoned
that the right to obtain a permit to develop one's land, like the right to register a pesticide,
was a governmental benefit. See id. at 859 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
661 See 483 U.S. at 842-64 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
3" Id. at 860 n.10 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
664 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Continuing to refer to Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467
U.S. 986 (1984), Justice Brennan disagreed with Justice Scalia's attempts to distinguish that
case from Malian. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 860 n.10 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He argued that
under a "natural rights" approach to takings, which the majority appeared to be asserting,
the plaintiff in Ruckelshaus would have had a superior claim to its trade secrets and the
disclosure law would have effected a taking. Id.
"3 See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 860 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"6 See id. at 865-66 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), 866-67 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
6" See id. at 865 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), 867 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
"a Id. at 867 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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poses. In other words, the argument focuses on whether, in order
to determine if a property right has been taken, one should look at
the entire parcel of property or consider individual rights within
the entire "bundle" of property rights."9 It appears that Justice
Scalia would argue that the property is comprised of many individ-
ual inherent rights and if just one is destroyed, a taking has oc-
curred. Under this theory, if the government interferes with a
landowner's right to develop the property, a taking will be found.
Other members of the Court, however, appear to believe that
the property and the rights attached thereto must be viewed as a
whole. 34° Under this theory, governmental interference with devel-
opment rights would need to be considered along with the remain-
ing uses of the parcel in order to determine if a property interest
has been taken. Thus, a prohibition on development would not
necessarily effect a taking.
The question of development rights, therefore, is one that
promises to remain for a number of years. If, however, the question
of Mr. Lucas's right to develop his land cannot be resolved by an
analysis of inherent property rights, perhaps it can be analyzed
visually. If Mr. Lucas stood on his property and looked merely to
the right and to the left, he would most likely believe that he was
free to build a home. His neighbors had already built homes and it
is unlikely that he would see any obstacle in his path to his own
land development. Should he, and the Court, look to the front and
back, however, those obstacles might become apparent.
To the front would stand the ocean, seemingly endless. To the
back would undoubtedly stand land, comprised of trees, grass and
other visible living organisms. But where is the line that separates
them? There is none written in the sand. Our only hope is to write
one in the laws. Perhaps the sight of the ocean might then place a
doubt in the mind of a reasonable landowner. Mr. Lucas undoubt-
edly purchased his property for the view and all that accompanies
it. He should not be so shortsighted to believe that he alone is
"9 See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 419 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing).
54° An additional ground for the argument that Mr. Lucas never had the right to develop
his property is that coastal land has always been held in the "public trust." The topic of the
public trust is, however, outside the scope of this note. For a discussion of some of the issues
surrounding the topic of the public trust, see Gilbert L. Firma Jr. Public Access to Coastal
Public Property: Judicial Theories and the Taking Issue, 67 N.C. L. REV. 627 (1989); Joseph L.
Sax, The Public Trutt Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH.
L. REV. 471 (1971).
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entitled to those treasures, treasures that future generations would
then be denied due to his "rights" to build on the beachfront.
The question that still remains, however, is whether such a seed
of doubt is sufficient to give the landowner notice of potential limits
on his or her property rights. That is for the Court to decide. It is
imperative that the Court approach the Lucas decision with an eye
towards the future, and as Justice Brennan so eloquently suggested
in Nollan, turn to a broader vision of property rights."' The Beach-
front Management Act exists because the South Carolina legislature
recognized the need for this broader vision.342 Thus, under this
view, Mr. Lucas would not have a legitimate expectation of devel-
oping his property and thus would not have a property interest that
could be taken under the Fifth Amendment.
B. The Beachfront Management Act Does Not Effect a Compensable
Taking of Mr. Lucas's Property
Determining whether Mr. Lucas has a property right that can
be taken under the Fifth Amendment is only the first step in the
takings analysis. 343 Assuming that he does have a valid property
interest, a second question remains. It must be determined whether
the State of South Carolina must compensate Mr. Lucas for that
property interest. Under the balancing test articulated in this note,
Mr. Lucas is not entitled to any compensation.
1. The Arguments of the Parties
Mr. Lucas made several arguments to the Court. His first ar-
gument was that a categorical nuisance exception to the compen-
sation requirement of the Fifth Amendment is contrary to the
Court's modern takings jurisprudence. 344 He argued that under
Pennsylvania Coal the private interest cannot be ignored, even if the
state has a legitimate reason for regulating land use. 345 Mr. Lucas
thus apparently recognized the need for a balancing approach in
takings cases. Mr. Lucas's second argument, however, retreated
3" See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 864 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
'' See S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-250 (Law. Co-op 1987 & Supp. 1991).
3" See supra note 305 and accompanying text for a discussion of the issues before the
United States Supreme Court in Lucas.
344 See Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 14, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C.), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 436 (1991) (No. 91-453).
343
 Id. at 14-15.
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from this admirable •position. 346 He argued that even if the Court
were to recognize a nuisance exception, the Court should not apply
that exception when the regulation eliminates the value of prop-
erty.347 Thus, in his second argument, Mr. Lucas appeared to argue
for a bright-line or categorical decisionmaking tool.
-Mr. Lucas's final argument once again apparently recognized
the need for a balancing test. 348 In this argument, he asserted that
a valid public purpose should not automatically cause a police power
action to be valid. 349 He cited to Penn Central, arguing that a takings
inquiry must include an analysis of "the character of the govern-
ment action."35° Thus, Mr. Lucas argued that in order to evaluate
a takings claim, a court must inquire into both the public and private
interest. 35 '
Rather than debate the advantages of one bright-line approach
over the other, the respondent, South Carolina Coastal Council,
appeared to focus its arguments on the need to fully balance all the
interests involved.352 The Council turned to the language of the
Penn Central Court and referred to the three factors that should be
considered. 353 These factors were the character of the government
action, interference with investment-backed expectations and the
economic impact of the action. 354
Focusing on the character of the government action, the Coun-
cil argued that the Beachfront Management Act was aimed at the
prevention of severe public harm. 355 Arguing that these harms are
analogous to those that the United States Supreme Court faced in
Mugler v. Kansas, the Council asserted that prevention of such harms
cannot be a taking. 356 Thus, like Mr. Lucas, the Council asked, as
an alternative to a balancing test, for a bright-line exception to the
compensation requirement of the Takings Clause. 357
Thus, even though each party has made several arguments,
each included one argument for a bright-line exception to the corn-
"6 See id. at 19-28.
547 Id. at 19.
340 See id. at 35-45.
345 Id. at 35.
336 Id. at 38.
351 Id. at 45.
3" See Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 18-50, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C.), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 436 (1991) (No. 91-453).
"'Id. at 18-19.
'5' Id.
"5 See id. at 7.
'" Id. at 37-38. The South Carolina Coastal Council also argues that Mr. Lucas has not
established that his property has suffered a total diminution in value. Id. at 47.
3" See id. at 28-40.
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pensation analysis. 358 Moreover, it was the bright-line rules that the
parties stressed during oral argument to the Court. 559 Mr. Lucas
asked that the Supreme Court hold that the Beachfront Manage-
ment Act constituted a taking of his private property because he
has no economic use left for his land. 56° The South Carolina Coastal
Council, on the other hand, asked that the Court hold that the Act
was not a taking because it is the prevention of a public nuisance. 36 '
If the Court were to adopt either of these provisions, it would have
a dramatic impact on future governmental regulation.
On the one hand, to say that beach erosion is a public nuisance
may go too far. It might become possible for the government to
regulate anything under such a broad definition. 362 On the other
hand, if the Court requires the state of South Carolina to compen-
sate Mr. Lucas simply because his land has lost its development
value, the government will have lost much of its ability to regulate
in any way. For example, a zoning ordinance might no longer be
valid if it stripped the landowner of the right to build a multi-story
"8 See Petitioners Brief on the Merits at 19-28, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
404 S,E.2d 895 (S.C.), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 436 (1991) (No. 91-453); Respondent's Brief
on the Merits at 28-40, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C.), cert.
granted, 112 S. Ct. 436 (1991) (No. 91-453),
"9 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 3 and 33-34, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C.), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 436 (1991) (No. 91-453).
so° See Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 19-28, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C.), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 436 (1991) (No. 91-453). Mr. A. Camden
Lewis, attorney for Mr. Lucas, began his oral argument by stating, "Our position is simple.
When Mr. Lucas was denied all economically viable uses of his land, these principles demand
that Mr. Lucas be paid just compensation for that taking." Transcript of Oral Argument at
3, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C.), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct.
436 (1991) (No. 91-453). This prompted one of the Justices to ask, "Would you be willing
to give it to Inc?' Id.
3B' See Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 28-40, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C.), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 436 (1991) (No. 91-453), Mr. C.C.
Harness III, attorney for the South Carolina Coastal Council, did, however, retreat slightly
from this categorical approach when pressed by the justices. See Transcript of Oral Argument
at 33-34, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C.), cert. granted, 112
S. Ct. 436 (1991) (No. 91-453). The Justices asked Mr. Harness whether the state of South
Carolina, under his theory, could require the removal of existing homes. Id. Mr. Harness
replied that the state could not require such removal for two reasons. See id. First, he said,
one must consider the reasonable expectations of landowners who have already built. Id.
Second, he said, one must look to the fact that South Carolina is attempting to prevent
ongoing damage to the land by prohibiting new construction. Id. Thus, Mr. Harness appeared
willing to acknowledge that prohibiting damage from the existing structures could not be
justified by the Council's bright-line nuisance standard. See id.
"2 Kaplan, supra note 7, at 70. Forcing governments to compensate landowners for
regulated land would cost billions of dollars. Id. Almost any land regulation would conceivably
be affected by such a requirement, including laws protecting wetlands, endangered wildlife,
nature habitats and historic districts. Id.
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structure. Moreover, the effect upon the coastal regions around the
United States would be profound. No government could pass a
protective regulation, no matter how imminent the harm was, with-
out fear of causing a taking. Approaching Lucas under a balancing
test that accounts for all interests involved would, however, apply
to only the parties to this case and would not have such broad,
overreaching effects.
2. The Analysis Under a Balancing Test
Mr. Lucas is clearly a very sympathetic plaintiff. The trial court
found that Mr. Lucas's property, worth more than one million
dollars without the building prohibition, had no economic value
remaining after the restrictions were imposed. 363 A further explo-
ration of the situation, however, indicates that this is incomplete.
For example, the National Flood Insurance Program364 protects
beachfront property owners from economic damage due to the
erosion of the shore by the ocean. 365 Without this program, many
oceanfront property owners would be unable to obtain insurance
on the private market except at prohibitive premium rates. 366 Be-
cause of the exorbitant cost of private insurance or the fear of
building an uninsured home that might fall into the sea, many
property owners might not have bought their property without the
federal insurance protection. 367 Thus, the conditions that make it
possible for someone like Mr. Lucas to live at the edge of the beach
were largely created by the federal government. 368 It seems unjust
that the state government should have to pay Mr. Lucas for "taking"
any increased property value caused by the flood insurance pro-
gram.
Even assuming that Mr. Lucas successfully argues that the value
of his property has substantially decreased, the Court should never-
theless consider and protect the public interest. In this case, Mr.
"' Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 8, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404
S.E.2d 895 (S.C.), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 436 (1991) (No. 91-453).
'61 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 4001-4128 (Law. Co-op 1989 & Supp. 1991).
'65 Id. 4001(g)(2)•
'66 See William J. Siffin, Bureaucracy, Entrepreneurship, and Natural Resources: Witless Policy
and the Barrier Islands, I CATO J. 293,296 (1981).
'67 See id.
568 Id. at 295. Another way to phrase this argument is to say that the price that Mr. Lucas
paid for his land included the right to be insured by the National Flood Insurance Program.
It must be recognized, however, that this same argument could be used to assert that the
federal government indirectly encouraged Mr. Lucas to buy the property in the first place.
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Lucas has not challenged the purpose of the Beachfront Manage-
ment Act. The South Carolina Supreme Court held that the Act's
purpose was to prohibit development along South Carolina beaches
that would jeopardize the stability of the beach, accelerate erosion
and endanger adjacent property. 369 The Act also refers to the beach
area as a habitat for many threatened or endangered species of
plants and animals, a natural health environment for the citizens of
the state and an important part of the state's tourism industry. 37°
Even if these purposes are not enough, under a balancing test,
to offset the economic harm suffered by Mr. Lucas, the public
interest in human safety should be considered as wel1. 37 ' The Beach-
front Management Act explicitly recognizes the fact that South
Carolina has no coordinated state policy for handling post-storm
emergencies along the state beaches. 372 Such a plan should, how-
ever, be the second line of defense in dealing with such emergencies,
not the first. Prohibiting building in areas that are particularly
susceptible to damage from a storm will save human lives. For
example, a hurricane often causes man-made structures to break
apart and become projectiles. 373 These projectiles are often whole
houses that create significant danger to homes and their inhabit-
ants. 374 Moreover, the property debris severely inhibits and in-
creases the cost of any rescue and relief program that is in effect. 375
The disasters caused by this debris could be prevented if only people
were not in its path.
Consideration of the public thus insures a careful balancing of
all the interests involved in Lucas. Under the factors established by
the Supreme Court in Penn Central, any economic harm suffered
by Mr. Lucas is clearly offset by the public need for the Beachfront
Management Act. The Act is the only protection for the natural
beachfront environment and animal habitats. Moreover, the Act not
only reduces the cost of storm clean-up and rescue, it eliminates
much of the need for these programs in the first place. Most im-
portantly, however, the Beachfront Management Act protects hu-
man habitats and saves human lives.
262 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895,897 (S.C.), cert. granted, 112
S. Ct. 436 (1991).
"° S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-250(1)(c) (Law. Co-op 1987 & Supp. 1991).
"I See Plater, supra note 301, at 203.
"2 S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-250(10).
"3 Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 32, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404
S.E.2d 895 (S.C.), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 436 (1991) (No. 91-453).
974 Id
971 Id.
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CONCLUSION
A tiling is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability,
and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends
otherwise. 376
The time has come for the United States Supreme Court to
move towards a broader vision of property rights. The Court can
no longer hide behind ineffective labels and confusing analytical
approaches to determine when government must compensate a
landowner for a regulatory action. It is time for the Court to ac-
knowledge explicitly that what one may do with one's property is
bounded on all sides by the public's interest in health, safety and
the preservation of our natural environment. Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council presents the Court with an opportunity to refine
takings jurisprudence in a way that recognizes these interests.
In Lucas, the severity of the harm that the Beachfront Man-
agement Act seeks to prevent outweighs the economic cost to the
individual landowner. If the Supreme Court avoids an explicit bal-
ancing of these interests now and requires the government of South
Carolina to compensate Mr. Lucas for his land, the decision will
have a profound impact on coastal regions around the country. In
these difficult economic times, governments cannot afford to com-
pensate landowners for even temporary takings and thus cannot
take any action to protect these fragile zones. That leaves govern-
ment only with the option of waiting until the destruction of our
beaches and coastal areas has become complete. Only then will the
courts recognize the public interest in environmental regulations
and acknowledge the necessity of accounting for all the interests
involved in such a regulation. if we had known thirty years ago
what we now know, the country would be in better shape today. We
cannot wait until the destruction is complete. The United States
Supreme Court has the opportunity to change course now. By
applying a fact-specific balancing test that includes equal consider-
ation of all interests, public and private, the Court will be acting to
preserve our natural community for generations to come.
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